

## COGNITIVE MECHANISMS: WHICH ONES ALLOW CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURS TO OBTAIN STARTUP FUNDING

Peter A. Koen, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ 07030

Gideon D. Markman, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12180-3590

Robert A. Baron, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12180-3590

Richard Reilly, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ 07030

### ABSTRACT

Previous research in corporate entrepreneurship found that selecting the right executive champion and requesting moderate initial funding was strongly correlated with start-up funding. Utilizing credible teams was found to be an important factor for projects receiving over \$1,000,000. However, understanding the cognitive abilities of the individuals receiving funding was not assessed. We found that funded teams were strongly correlated ( $R^2 = .875$ ;  $p=0.000$ ) with higher levels of predevelopment meticulousness (i.e. attention to detail and up front planning), social influence and were less risk averse. These results suggest that team level cognitive attributes can predict which teams are more likely to receive start-up funding.

### INTRODUCTION

Innovation is a growing source of strategic advantage for emerging and established organizations. As they search for innovative ways to respond to complex environments many incumbents realize that corporate entrepreneurship is a key in improving the speed and effectiveness by which their organization reacts to emerging competition. To name a few, corporate entrepreneurship is essential for market pioneering (Covin, Slevin, Heeley, 2000), the creation of knowledge, goods, and services (Zahra, Jennings, & Kuratko, 1999), and restructuring and retrenchment activities (Filatotchev, Wright, Buck, & Zhukov, 1999). Yet, developing a business plan and obtaining start-up funds in large corporations is inherently frustrating and difficult (Venkataraman, Shane, McGrath & MacMillan, 1993).

Organization theory suggests that the determinants of capital funding – regardless of context (e.g., inside or outside a corporation) – is multifaceted. Funding decisions are a function of sufficient strategic fit, incumbents' business acumen and marketplace understanding, as well as the development of comprehensive business plans. For example, it has been argued that business plans are a mechanism by which would-be-entrepreneurs legitimize their new ideas. That is, the business plan aid corporate entrepreneurs to assess there overarching strategy and specific tactics; and identify product derivatives, spin-off technologies, and novel market applications. The business plan is also useful to weighing competitors' reaction (e.g., time and ease at which a product or technology may be reverse-engineered) and costs of protecting emerging intellectual property. Interestingly, business-plan competitions have become important rites of passage in many MBA programs, where participants – guided by the entrepreneurship educators – test their concepts.

However, recent research by Koen (1999) indicate that the traditional business factors of strategic fit, business acumen and marketplace understanding are necessary but not sufficient factors for obtaining start-up funds in large corporations. Selecting the right executive champion and requesting modest amount of funding were essential for obtaining funds. Teams which have a history of being successful (i.e. credible teams) were found to be an essential criteria for obtaining start-up funding for over one million dollars. Teams with an outstanding track record were also found to be an essential criteria for obtaining large seed capital. These findings provide knowledge on the critical success factors. However does teams' cognitive and social orientation also influence the ability to secure capital and resources for newly initiated corporate projects. Specifically, we predicted that teams' predevelopment meticulousness, social influence, risk aversion, and learning motivation would be related to favorable funding.

To this end we conducted a multi-company intervention over a 12-week period with employees from 11 large companies (i.e. Engelhard, Ethicon, Hitachi, Honeywell, JP Morgan, Lucent, L3 Communications, MITRE, Motorola, Nabisco and the US Army Communications – Electronic Command Research and Development Center) and one small Venture Capital Start-Up (VisiTalk).(See Note 1) Teams from each of the firms attempted to obtain funding for their idea at the end of the intervention for a new product or service concept, which was not already in the company's development pipeline. Start-up funding from \$25,000 to \$550,000 was obtained for 10 of the 16 projects. We regressed the amount of funding teams secured at the end of the intervention on teams' scores on each of the dimensions described above (predevelopment meticulousness, social influence, risk aversion, and learning motivation). Results suggest that teams' predevelopment meticulousness and social influence, as measured at the beginning of the intervention were highly related to the funding that were ultimately secured.

## THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

### Predevelopment Meticulousness

This construct refers to the level of predevelopment planning activities done to support the project. Predevelopment activities refer to the level of up-front planning done before significant product development activities commenced. Song and Parry (1996) have shown that proficiency in these activities is strongly related to product development success although weakly related to overall product success. We therefore suggest that great effort during the up front planning would be expected to result in better-conceived plan which should increase the likelihood of funding.

Although the utility of strategic planning remains questionable (Mintzberg, 1993), we argue that a detailed business plan signals assurance; it demonstrates thoughtfulness and great attention to detail which in turn calm diverse stakeholders' concerns. A detailed plan can serve as a blueprint to securing capital, accessing markets, recruiting key employees, developing a strategic plan, and for projecting growth objectives. In this respect predevelopment meticulousness may also help to reduce information asymmetry between corporate decision-makers and the entrepreneurs who seek their support. In sum, while predevelopment meticulousness – as reflected in detailed and comprehensive business plans – may not be able to educate all stakeholders about the intricacy of any novel technology, it is nevertheless a necessary ritual in the race to legitimize resource allocation.

*Hypothesis 1: Predevelopment meticulousness will be positively related to subsequent funding.*

## Social Influence

Explicit and implicit opinions and decisions are formed through repeated interactions between persons in spite of the fact that they may see the world very differently. Thus, in organizations, decision-making is hardly ever determined in a vacuum and incumbents' perceptions, attitudes, and actions are molded by both professional and social interactions (Ibarra & Andrews, 1993). Research in social psychology suggests that all of us are both the recipients and users of many acts of *social influence* – efforts to change others' attitudes, beliefs, or behavior in ways desired by the persuader. As such, effective persuasion is facilitated by social or professional relationships between source and audience. Since social influence and persuasion are essential for success in many settings including counseling, negotiation, and sales and marketing, we suspect that their effective implementation in entrepreneurship – particularly during early stages of venture formation – will yield positive returns. Indeed, individuals who are proficient in using social influence tend to attain more favorable outcomes than less persuasive individuals.

An interesting question, however, is whether the benefits of social influence at the individual level would transfer to and manifest at the team level. Reframed in the context of corporate entrepreneurship we ask whether teams comprised of members who are adept at social influence are more likely to secure funding than teams comprised of less persuasive members? The answer – according to theory – is categorically “yes.” A key challenge corporate entrepreneurs face is to successfully sway others (e.g., corporate venture capitalists, bankers, employers, co-workers, suppliers, and customers) to invest resources in what is a new and uncertain venture. Previous research Koen (1999) showed the importance of the executive champion to the ultimate funding decision. The teams with better persuasion skills and who understand the social context of their interaction would be expected to form a better relationship with the executive champion. In such contexts adroitness in persuasion and social influence – all else being equal – may determine the likelihood of securing corporate capital and support for the young venture.

To recap, entrepreneurial teams do not operate in a context-less vacuum; they can actively influence their social-professional space and thus their likelihood to attained access to valued resources. Teams that are more effective at influencing their organization-wide constituencies have greater access to and control over a broad array of resources and opportunities. Since perceptions are socially constructed in the course of interactions with others, our theoretical emphasis is on perceived social influence to access resource. A corollary of this is that teams that perceive stronger social influence will attain larger funding than teams whose perceived influence over their constituencies is limited. To the extent that this is so, the following hypothesis follows logically:

*Hypothesis 2: The greater the teams' adeptness with respect to persuasion and other techniques for exerting social influence, the greater their financial funding.*

## Risk Aversion

We accept assertions that one does not know all the risks one faces and that different individuals – even under similar settings – may exhibit different attitudes toward risk (Sullivan & Kida, 1995; Trimpop & Kirkcaldy, 1997). We also agree that championing a new venture may be framed as a high-risk situation (Stewart, Watson, Carland, Carland, 1999). For example, corporate entrepreneurship is a prime mechanism by which a team of employees explores new technology or advocates product and process innovation with uncertain outcomes. As the nature,

seriousness, and consequences of venturing out are as a minimum quite indefinable, the way one deals with these uncertainties depends, at least to some extent, on risk perception and risk judgment.

Prospect theory suggests that corporate entrepreneurs may experience financial distress (e.g., being demoted or fired) when their projects and initiatives fail to meet the agreed upon deadlines, objectives, or budgets. Since at the extreme the success or failure of a new venture spills over and affects the corporation, personal distress is at its peak when a failing initiative begins to impact a corporation's viability. Similarly, the more radical and intensive a new project is in terms of technical depth, span, and complexity, the higher the exposure to financial risk and social humiliation (e.g., professional immobility, demotion, or being fired) to team members who championed that project. Therefore, *ceteris paribus*, risk-averse entrepreneurial teams are more likely to pursue modest projects that require limited funding; they will act to reduce their risk exposure by pursuing modest and more certain projects (see Note 2).

*Hypothesis 3: The higher the aversion a team has to risk the lower the amount of funding the team will secure.*

### Learning Motivation

It has often been suggested that entrepreneurs are higher than other persons with respect to achievement motivation – the desire to accomplish difficult tasks and to excel at doing so. However, past research has failed to yield strong or consistent support for this hypothesis. One reason for these negative results is suggested by recent, sophisticated, investigations of achievement motivation. This recent work suggests that in fact, such motivation involves two distinctly different components. On the one hand, achievement motivation seems to encompass learning goals or task involvement: the desire to develop one's skills and to master tasks primarily for the sake of doing so. On the other hand, achievement motivation also seems to involve performance goals or ego involvement: the desire to demonstrate superior competence at a task in order to gain favorable judgments about one's competence from others. The results of many studies suggest that these two components of achievement are distinct and largely independent (see, e.g., Jagacinski & Duda, 2000).

We reason that while both learning and performance motivation may play a role in success in a wide range of activities, successful corporate entrepreneurs will tend to be higher than other persons in learning motivation. In other words, teams of successful corporate entrepreneurs will focus – more so than less successful teams – on enhancing their skills and meeting internal standards of excellence. While we agree that entrepreneurs do want to be seen as competent by others (indeed, this is crucial for such important activities as obtaining funding and attracting talented employees or partners), we also suggest entrepreneurs will be more interested in doing well simply for the sense of accomplishment. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 4: The higher the teams' learning motivation the greater their financial funding.*

## RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGY

### Intervention

The intervention was comprised of three parts. The foundation portion, or first part, reviews for the employees the key success factors for new projects. The company portion, or second part, reviews the organizational and cultural factors affecting the success of new projects. In the final portion, the employees develop a business plan and attempt to obtain funding for their own project in teams comprised of 3-6 members (i.e., corporate entrepreneurs). The intervention was given over a 12-week period, meeting for several hours each week. Start-up funding from \$25,000 to \$550,000 was obtained for 10 of the 16 projects at the end of the 12-week intervention.

### Part I - Foundation

The principal purpose of this portion is to allow the employees to learn the key success factors associated with successful projects by discussing key articles in the literature. Employees were encouraged to choose projects that offer a unique product advantage to the customer, where there is good market and technical synergy and where the market conditions are favorable. Further they were encouraged to optimize speed to the market in their proposal by trading off market dynamics against costs and competitor strengths. The major emphasis was concentrated on the factors that the corporate entrepreneur could influence during the conceptualization of the idea. Activities related to market test and market launch were excluded since they dealt with factors important to later stages of the development process. Based upon this foundation, it was felt that the employees would understand the key issues associated with successful projects and be able to better self-select the higher potential ones. These concepts were further reinforced when the employees evaluated successful and unsuccessful project in their own companies.

### Part II - Organizational and Cultural Factors

In order to be successful in acquiring resources, the corporate entrepreneur needs to understand the often-prevalent difficulty that corporations have with new projects that are out of sequence with the funding cycle. Organizational and cultural factors (Burgelman, 1984) along with management behaviors (MacMillan & George, 1985; Venkataraman, Shane, McGrath, & MacMillan, 1993) are reviewed since they play a significant role in determining new product success. Employees then studied their respective organizational structure so that they can better understand the obstacles and hurdles that they are likely to encounter. All projects required an executive champion (i.e., an active liaison between the newly emerging team and the corporation). The rationale is that since corporate entrepreneurship typically involves activities that disobey "normal rules and procedures" and occasionally violate organizational power structure, the executive champions can help to attenuate and absorb some of the risk. Venkataraman, MacMillan, and McGrath (1992) highlighted the need for champions by indicating that "... new ideas are resisted within the organization and are often viewed with suspicion, a new venture idea requires one or more powerful agents" (p. 503). Others suggested that finding a sponsor is critical for securing resources for new products (Tighe, 1998).

### Part III - Business Plan Development

Developing a business plan for the new idea represents the final project of the intervention. The proficiency of developing the idea into business terms has been shown to be important to new product development success definition (Bacon, Beckman, Mowery, & Wilson, 1994; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Song & Parry, 1996). The business plan involves a clear product definition (Bacon, Beckman, Mowery & Wilson, 1994) and emphasizes the risk and assumptions (MacMillan, Block & Narashimha, 1986; McGrath & MacMillan, 1995) associated

with start-up rather than focusing on elaborate financials. The participants were required to complete the business plan and attempt to obtain funding.

### Procedures and Measures

At the very beginning of the 12-week intervention, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire that was designed to assess their predevelopment meticulousness, social influence, risk aversion, and learning orientation. We reasoned that early use of the questionnaire would avoid post hoc recall biases stemming from respondents' knowledge as to whether their project was funded or not. Items measuring predevelopment meticulousness were adopted from business planning constructs developed by McMillian, Zemmann and Narasimha (1987) and Song and Parry (1987). These questions capture the attention to detail and the level of up front planning. The other items, which measured social influence, risk averse, and learning motivation were adapted from widely used measures of social skills (Riggio, 1986), cognitive mechanisms (Markman & Baron, 1999), and motivation (Jagacinski & Duda, 1999). The questions that made up these constructs are given in the Table 4. As indicated in the table, all the constructs had attained an acceptable level of reliability. In order to maintain confidentiality and assure accurate responses the entrepreneurs anonymously filled out the questionnaires. Completed questionnaires were obtained from 80 of the 87 students attending the intervention. The missing questionnaires were distributed between the teams with 12 teams having completed questionnaires from all the members, while the lowest responding team had more than 67% of the questionnaire complete. The missing questionnaires were from participants who could not attend the initial session of the intervention. Each project required a letter from the executive champion that stated whether the project received funding and the total amount of funding received.

### RESULTS

The means, standard deviations, and correlation matrix for the variables are shown in Table 1. In the present case our primary focus was in testing the overall hypothesis that a specific set of variables was related to funding level. Prior to additional analysis, all variables were examined through various SPSS programs for accuracy of data entry, missing values, and fit between their distributions and the assumptions of regression analysis. While missing values were replaced by the mean for all cases, two univariate outliers for team number 13 on Predevelopment meticulousness and Funding were identified. Further assessment showed that despite that team 13 inflates the correlation (between predevelopment meticulousness and funding), relationships between predevelopment meticulousness and funding remains significant even when the case is dropped from the analysis. As the sample is exceedingly small and the relationship without team 13 remained robust, we opted to leave the case in our analysis.

The sample size provided less than the minimum 5:1 ratio of cases to variables suggested by most experts (e.g., Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995). Although small samples may result in overfitting and large standard errors for regression weights, the tests of significance are still valid, albeit with reduced power. One approach to addressing some of the limitations of a small sample is the use of resampling techniques (cf., Wenpin & Sumantra, 1998). Specifically, a variation of the "jackknifing" technique described by Tukey (1977) was used on the current data. We reanalyzed our data 16 times, each time holding out one case. The results of this resampling procedure allowed us to examine the impact of each and every case on the overall F-test for the model as well as the significance of the coefficients. Finally, the jackknifing procedure allowed us to compute an almost unbiased estimate of a cross validity coefficient.

The results of the jackknifing procedure showed that in all 16 samples of N-1, the F-test was significant at the .05 level. In all cases the coefficient for Learning Motivation was negative. In 15 of the 16 cases, the coefficients for Predevelopment meticulousness, Social Influence and Risk Aversion were significant beyond the .05 level (one-tailed test). An estimate of the cross-validity of the prediction equation was obtained by predicting the Nth case in each of the N-1 samples and comparing the predicted value with the actual value to obtain an almost unbiased estimate of the standard error of estimate using the formula:  $S^2_e = \sum(y_i - y'_i)^2 / (N-1)$ . A cross-validity estimate was then obtained by the formula:  $R' = (1 - S^2_e / S^2_y)^{-1/2}$ ; where  $S^2_y$  is the sample standard deviation of funding. The resulting estimate was  $R' = .55$ .

A standard multiple regression was performed between the amount of funding secured as the dependent variable and predevelopment meticulousness, social influence, risk aversion, and learning orientation. Table 2 displays the unstandardized regression coefficients (B-weights), standardized regression coefficients ( $\beta$ ), the  $R^2$ , and the adjusted  $R^2$ .  $R$  for the regression was significantly different from zero.  $F(4, 11) = 27.22$ ;  $p = .000$ . Three of the IVs – predevelopment meticulousness, social influence, and risk aversion – explained significant amount of the variance surrounding funding and were in the predicted direction. The fourth variable, learning motivation, had a negative regression weight and was thus not significant for our hypothesis, which predicted a positive relationship.

## PROJECT MIX

Relative innovativeness of the projects may have influenced the results. Projects were grouped in Table 3 into six distinct categories using the format suggested by Griffin and Page (1996). Table 3 may be further subdivided into high risk (i.e. new to the world and new to the company) and low risk projects (i.e. add to existing product lines, improvements to existing products, repositioning and cost reductions). Low risk projects constitute 88%% of the total projects with 79% obtaining funding. In contrast, high-risk projects constituted 12% of the total with none of the projects obtaining funding. Funding of only low risk projects is not surprising due to the short time frame of the intervention.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The ability to obtain start-up funding for new corporate projects is inherently frustrating and difficult, the aim of this study was to examine the relationships between four team-level variables and funding. Results showed that teams' predevelopment meticulousness, social influence, and risk aversion – but not learning orientation – were significant predictors of funding volume. Thus, it seems that certain team-level attributes contribute to our understanding of correlates to the amount of money teams secured.

As the predictors were measured prior to the beginning of the intervention (to assure that there was no retrospective recall biases), our findings suggest the predicting corporate teams' success in attaining seed capital is less uncertain than we originally thought. Indeed, the high correlations between predevelopment meticulousness and funding ( $r = .74$ ;  $p = .001$ ) – small sample size aside – suggests that predevelopment meticulousness is a robust predictor of funding volume. Interestingly, recent research in new product development (NPD) also identified interesting relationships between creativity and product profitability (Stevens, Burley, & Divine, 1999). Thus, our study suggests that we can predict the probability of which teams will get funded based on their predevelopment meticulousness. Seen in this light, attention to particulars such as in the business plan is a key to obtaining corporate capital, perhaps because it is an indicator of the team's adherence to fine points, which should, at least in theory, improve the

odds for success in the near future. Other attributes that were found to be important to the funding decision were social influence and risk aversion.

Our findings that predevelopment meticulousness and social influence are positively related to funding volume complements earlier research advocating the importance of the executive champion to the funding decision. Using a similar intervention with a large number of teams (N=49), Koen (1999) showed that forming a compatible relationship with the executive champion (i.e., liaisons) was significantly ( $p = 0.02$ ) related to the funding decision. The importance of the executive champion to entirely new projects in a corporation is a consistent theme supported by other researchers (Knight, 1987; MacMillian & George, 1985; Tighe 1998; Venkataraman, MacMillian, & McGrath, 1992). These findings suggest that teams, which carefully attended to details were better able to convince the executive champion of the value of their project. Along the same line, teams skilled at social influence were probably better able to develop and reinforce a positive interaction with the executive champion. In fact, the higher a team's social influence skills the better their ability to convince other people in the organization that this project merited funding.

Risk aversion was also correlated with funding – though not as strongly. This may indicate that the teams who were able to obtain funding were less afraid to take risk. Learning motivation was also negatively related to funding, which goes against our last hypothesis and is uneasily explained. Ostensibly one would have expected a positive correlation with funded teams being more willing to learn new things and take on difficult tasks. All of the funded projects were in a lower risk category that probably utilized knowledge that already existed in the company – thus decreasing the need to learn new things. Thus the negative correlation with learning orientation might be related to project type. While we were tempted to provide additional rationales, logic (i.e., the exceedingly small sample size) suggests that additional research with a larger number of teams is needed.

### Limitations

Intervention research is inherently incomplete depictions of the “general” world. Our study was designed to reexamine the relationship of various cognitive and social mechanisms at the team level and corporate funding. By necessity, then, our intervention was restricted by the setting and scope and leads us to overlook some potentially important factors. For instance, both the sample size and project time horizon limit generalization, which suggests that the study needs to be replicated with a larger sample size and over longer time frame to validate our predictions. In addition, all of the projects that were funded were relatively low risk projects. The cognitive issues may be different when start-up funding is needed for higher risk projects.

### Implications

This research is important for a couple of reasons. It provides a unique opportunity to extend our knowledge and theory regarding firm growth and success in initiating new projects within large corporations. This is particularly important in turbulent periods where large firms are downsizing as corporate entrepreneurs generate new capital to their organizations and provide new employment. Our study also replicates and extends prior work in entrepreneurship (cf., Koen, 1999). Finally, findings from our research and intervention are highly authentic. The study was carried out in the context of established corporations, where successful teams of entrepreneurs develop business initiatives in which the successful plans lead to actual funding. Thus the research permitted a direct comparison of teams who secured capital, and who therefore responsible for inter-business creation, with teams who tried, but failed to attain capital.

## NOTES

1. The Venture Capital Start-Up is included since one of the students left his large company during the time the course was being taught, began working at the start-up and convinced his team to try to get a new project started within his new company.
2. This prediction is not in conflict with recent findings that entrepreneurs as a group are not risk takers (cf., Palich & Bagby, 1995). That is, there is a distinct difference between being risk averse and risk seeker and the former is not the opposite of the latter (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).

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Table 1: The means, standard deviations, and correlation matrix

	Mean	sd	1	2	3	4	5
1. Funding	\$83,000	\$147,000					
2. Meticulousness	4.16	.43	0.74**	(.77)			
3. Social Influence	4.78	.46	0.40*	-0.11	(.86)		
4. Risk Aversion	3.93	.27	-0.27	0.14	-0.25	(.75)	
5. Learning Motivation	6.11	.44	-0.32	-0.10	0.04	0.11	(.82)

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (1-tailed).

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.06 level (1-tailed).

Table 2: Regression

	B-weight	$\beta$	t-value
(Constant)	748179.85		-2.17*
Meticulousness	276507.29	0.80	8.59**
Social Influence	141209.43	0.44	4.63**
Risk Aversion	-134138.45	-0.25	-2.57**
Learning Motivation	-76438.14	-0.23	-2.48

Dependent Variable: Amount of Funding Secured at Course End (\$000)

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

N = 16; Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .875; F(4, 11) = 27.22; p = .000

Table 3: Project Mix (n=16)

Project Strategy	Funded:	Yes	No	Total
New to the World <i>New products or services that create an entirely new market.</i>				
New to the Company <i>New products or services that, for the first time, allow a company to enter an established market.</i>			2	2
Add to Existing Product Lines <i>New products or services that supplement a company's established product lines.</i>		6	2	8
Improvements in/Revisions to Existing Products <i>New products or services that provide improved performance or greater perceived value and replace existing products.</i>		2	1	3
Repositioning <i>Existing products or services targeted to new markets or market segments.</i>		1		1
Cost Reduction <i>New products or services that provide similar performance at lower cost.</i>		2		2
	Total	11	5	16

Table 4. Constructs Reliability

Variable the comprises the measure	Item Total Correlations
<i>Predevelopment Meticulousness</i> ( $\alpha = .767$ )	
Importance of establishing a timetable for succeeding product development stages	.596
Importance of developing a well thought out plan for succeeding product development stages	.590
Importance of understanding the business aspects.	.515
Importance of developing a comprehensive business plan	.501
Importance of attending to detail	.494
<i>Risk Aversion</i> ( $\alpha = .749$ )	
I feel smart when I do something without making any mistakes	.673
I feel smart when I can do something better than most other people	.636
I prefer to do things that I can do well rather than things that I do poorly	.452
The opinions of others have about how well I can do certain things are important to me	.436
<i>Learning Motivation</i> ( $\alpha = .821$ )	
The opportunity to do challenging work is important to me	.704
When I fail to complete a difficult task, I plan to try harder the next time I work on it	.626
I do my best when I'm working on a fairly difficult task	.579
I try hard to improve on my past performance	.566
The opportunity to learn new things is important to me	.517
The opportunity to extend the range of my abilities is important to me	.505
When I have difficulty solving a problem, I enjoy trying different approaches to see which one will work	.497
<i>Social Influence</i> ( $\alpha = .861$ )	
I can get other to do what I want	.794
I can persuade others to do almost anything	.708
If I set out to persuade someone--to change their views on an issue--I am usually quite successful in doing so	.707
I can talk others into taking my side or into adopting my point of view	.665
N = 80 (16 Teams)	